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Over the past twenty years, the phenomenon of Human Rights Cinema has emerged 
as an important way to think about the relationship between visual culture, human 
rights and activism. This article will interrogate some of the presuppositions behind 
this phenomenon and examine what it means for both cinema and the concept of 
human rights. The article will then look at The Act of Killing, a 2012 documentary that 
has raised many questions for the project of Human Rights Cinema. It will be argued 
that The Act of Killing does not fit easily within the canon of Human Rights Cinema, 
not simply because of controversies surrounding its making, but also because of the 
challenges it poses for ideas of spectatorship and authority. Furthermore, this article 
will propose that Slavoj Žižek’s observations on The Act of Killing provide a useful 
means to critique the understanding of human rights predominant in the concept of 
Human Rights Cinema.
1. Human Rights Cinema and the question of truth
Since the early 1990s, a plethora of human rights film festivals has sprung up around 
the world, effectively inventing the concept of Human Rights Cinema. This now 
widely accepted category of film brings together the aesthetic concerns of the film-
maker with those of the human rights activist. Human rights film festivals, the 
earliest being that of Seattle in 1992, are attended annually by thousands of people, 
and have played a vital role in advancing the idea of Human Rights Cinema. In 1994, 
the Human Rights Film Network was established in Prague. The Network, whose 
secretariat is run by Amnesty International, now organises forty-one film festivals 
around the world, including events in cities such as Melbourne, Seoul, Paris, Pretoria 
and Buenos Aires (Human Rights Film Network 2017). Additionally, Human Rights 
Watch organises some twelve film festivals in major cities around the globe (Human 
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Rights Watch 2017). A proliferation of scholarly publications and university courses 
add to the sense that Human Rights Cinema is an idea whose star can only continue 
to grow (Tascón 2015).
Although many of the film festivals in the Human Rights Film Network are 
held in developing countries, human rights films are still more likely to be made 
by, watched by and financed by those in wealthy countries. An examination of the 
listings of Human Rights Film Festivals reveals a preponderance of films dealing with 
civil and political freedoms, and rather fewer that deal with poverty and deprivation. 
In this sense, the phenomenon of Human Rights Cinema is a microcosm of the 
international human rights system, which unofficially operates a similar hierarchy 
of rights. In the true style of a human rights organisation, the Human Rights Film 
Network has a Charter, adopted in 2004, which seeks to articulate the concept of 
Human Rights Film. The Charter articulates a common strategy for film-makers 
towards a shared end. To this limited extent, it has echoes of art manifestos of the 
early twentieth century. However, this is where the similarity ends. The art manifestos 
of the early twentieth century, such as the Dada manifesto of 1915 or the Surrealist 
manifesto of 1924, often sought to shock their readers, or to become art-works in 
themselves. By contrast, the Charter of the Human Rights Film Network frames 
its vision in restrained, legalistic language. Indeed, it resembles a Human Rights 
Convention, with numbered articles to outline its organising principles. The Charter 
begins by committing its members in Article 1.2 to the promotion of human rights 
film (Human Rights Watch 2017). Article 2.3 attempts to define human rights films 
as ‘films that reflect, inform on and provide understanding of the actual state of past 
and present human rights violations, or the visions and aspirations concerning ways 
to redress those violations.’ Article 2.2 commits the Network to promote a ‘broad 
concept of human rights, on the basis of international standards as embedded in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international law.’ Article 2.3 says 
that human rights films 
have superseded common notions of ‘left or ‘right’. They have, implicitly 
or explicitly, been based on human rights tenets even before the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was established in 1948. 
Article 2.3 also allows for a multiplicity of film genres within Human Rights 
Cinema, saying that human rights films can be ‘documentary, fiction, experimental 
or animation’ and adds that: ‘Human rights films may be harshly realistic, or highly 
utopian. They may offer gruesome pictures, or show the bliss of peaceful life. They 
may report, denounce or convey an emotional message’.
Crucially however, Article 2.3 also states:
We believe that human rights films, whatever their format, contents or character, 
should be ‘truthful’. That is, they should inform the viewers on human rights 
issues and aspirations, and should not intentionally misrepresent the facts or 
the views or words of those portrayed. They should not be so biased as to invoke 
hatred and discrimination against groups and individuals, or serve political or 
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commercial interests only. They should be explorative of the issue rather than 
propagandistic, and not reproduce stereotypes. 
This indicates that Article 2.3, while acknowledging that Human Rights Cinema can 
embrace a variety of film genres, insists on a commitment to the truthful depiction 
of the reality of human rights violation. There is an interesting supposition here that 
the violation of legal categories can be made visible through their ‘truthful’ depiction. 
Human Rights are, after all, legal instruments, notwithstanding any normative 
content they may have. The nature of this supposition, and what it says about the 
conception of truth in Human Rights Cinema will be explored in this article.
An important supplement to the Charter is to be found in Daan Bronkhorst’s 
influential essay, Human Rights Film Network – Reflections on its History, Principles and 
Practices (Bronkhorst 2003). This essay, widely disseminated by Human Rights Film 
Festivals, has played an important role in defining Human Rights Film. Bronkhorst 
charts the nexus between human rights and film with the purpose of articulating 
a ‘theory of the human rights film’. In his essay, he traces the historical origins of 
human rights, noting that films that have ‘implicitly or explicitly based on human 
rights tenets’ can be dated back to well before the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, to early documentary films such as The Battle of the Somme, Spanish 
Earth (1937) and feature films such as J’accuse (1918), The Big Parade 1925) and The 
Great Dictator (1940). He discusses the continuity of human rights concerns to a 
long list of feature films that ranges from Judgement at Nuremberg to The Green Mile 
(1999) and The Killing Fields (1984).
Bronkhorst broadly divides his discussion of Human Film into two parts, 
one dealing with documentary films and the other dealing with feature films. 
Unsurprisingly, the documentary form tends to predominate in Human Rights 
Film Festivals. The One World Film Festival in Prague, for example, only screens 
documentaries. Bronkhorst outlines a typology of four main types of human rights 
documentary. The first is the Explanatory Documentary, which seeks to document 
a question involving human rights through the use of interviews, images and 
commentary. The second is the Denunciatory Documentary, which is concerned 
with identifying responsibility for human rights abuses. The third is the Search 
Documentary, which concerns the film-maker’s personal search for the truth behind 
a particular human rights issue. Finally, there is the Testimonial Documentary, 
which bears witness to the experience of people affected by the abuse of human 
rights. Bronkhorst describes this final category of Testimonial Documentary as the 
‘culmination of the genre’, noting that ‘so much has already been said and explained by 
so many people, that by now a straightforward personal expression seems to suffice’ 
(Bronkhorst 2003). However, notwithstanding this, he recognises the problematic 
nature of his claim, as the testimonial film-maker must tell a story as well as bear 
witness; Testimony must be conveyed in a way that is interesting and engaging for 
the viewer. However, he does not see this opposition between testimony and story-
telling as an irresolvable one for the concept of Human Rights Cinema. Instead, he 
observes:
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The visual language of film has increasingly become a language of suggestion, of 
images that evoke other images, and may be accompanied by a spoken comment 
which is suggestive and non-hermetic. In this way a language of ambiguity is 
realized (Bronkhorst 2003).  
The fluidity of the relationship between narrative and testimony becomes, in his 
account, a challenge to be taken up by film-makers: 
The human rights film, both as a documentary and as a feature film, can explore 
the border area of the struggle between reason and emotion. It is precisely in 
this area that lies the vitality of human rights activism’ (Bronkhorst 2003). 
Bronkhorst’s typology of documentary film, and its culmination in Testimonial 
Documentary, has much to say about the relationship between Human Rights 
Cinema and truth. Each of these categories of human rights documentary evince 
the commitment to the idea that human rights film must always convey the reality 
of human rights violations truthfully. However, each category also does more than 
simply present evidence in forensic form. Instead, each must also engage the viewer 
in different ways. In all of them, narrative plays an important role; a story must be 
told—whether it is the story of the victim, the human rights defender or indeed that 
of the film-maker. Despite the predominance of the documentary form in Human 
Rights Cinema, the boundary between documentary and fictional feature films is 
not a clear one, but has involved a historical borrowing of styles and techniques. 
However, as documentary films are more typically used to depict a factual situation, 
they are often considered to be ‘superior to fiction films because of their pretension 
to monopolize the market of the truth’ (Loshitsky 1999, 361). 
For Bronkhorst, the question of truth in Human Rights Cinema emerges as 
an area of contestation. He articulates this as a challenge to the film-maker to be 
simultaneously an activist and a story-teller. The deeper challenge at stake here, 
however, is that of properly articulating the relationship between Human Rights 
Cinema and truth. Bronkhorst argues that the distinguishing feature of a human 
rights film, is not its relation to truth, but to truthfulness. This means that Human 
Rights Cinema must not be simply concerned with the telling of stories that are true, 
but also display a normative commitment to truthfulness. His model of truthfulness is 
here derived from Habermas’ concept of communicative rationality, which describes 
three criteria for truthfulness in communication. First, a communication should 
‘correspond to the facts’; Second, a communication should comply with a ‘normative 
system within which both those making the statement and those receiving it are able 
to make judgements’; Third, a true statement must be ‘sincere’, ‘honest’, ‘truthful’. 
Habermas’ conception of truthfulness is, in turn, a pre-condition for deliberative 
communication. The ‘sincerity’ to which Bronkhorst refers corresponds to Habermas’ 
appropriation (in various parts of his model of communicative rationality) of the 
Kantian concept of Wahrhaftigkeit. The concept of Wahrhaftigkeit implies more than 
merely abstaining from deception in communication, but translates as a striving for 
truth, by being ‘true to one’s inner self ’, or finding ‘one’s innermost identity’ (Steiner 
Barry Collins Human Rights Cinema
69
2013, 92). The idea of truthfulness in Article 2.3 of the Charter resonates with this 
conception of truthfulness as an abstention from intentional deception. By situating 
Human Rights Cinema within a register of ‘truthfulness’ rather than one of mere 
‘truth’, Bronkhorst allows the conception of Human Rights Cinema to cross the 
boundary between documentary (which typically claims to truthfully depict facts) 
and fictional feature film (which typically does not). Furthermore, by establishing 
truthfulness as a pre-condition for Human Rights Cinema, he effectively situates 
human rights film as part of a deliberative process within a normative system.
However, the conjunction of human rights and film belies a more complex 
relationship between truth and fiction than Bronkhorst would lead one to believe. 
Tascón observes:
Visual textuality has a particular relationship to truth. While semantically 
speaking, the visual image is but another type of symbol-and thus already a 
mediated experience, because of its highly motivated and iconic status as a 
symbol-it is often read as a transparent form of communication and is closer, 
therefore, to ‘the truth’ (Tascón 2012, 869).
Documentary film, in particular Testimonial Documentary, also appears to offer a 
revelation of truth by deploying rhetorical conventions which themselves denote 
truthfulness. Tascón adds: 
conventions such as testimonies of survivors, interviews with professionals in 
the field of enquiry, and of course, the hand-held camera, all provide ways to 
strengthen this film-forms ability to tell the ‘truth’ (Tascón 2012, 870).  
To a lawyer’s eye, there are, of course, some obvious problems to the elevation of 
Testimonial Documentary as an indicator of truthfulness. The special role of testimony 
in the concept of Human Rights Cinema echoes the importance that testimony 
plays in legal cases. Many of the same problems of testimony that arise in litigation 
also apply to documentary film. Problems of memory, hearsay and reliability apply 
here as they do in, for example, criminal proceedings, or indeed hearings of truth 
and reconciliation commissions (Campbell 2002). In testimonial film, there is the 
additional issue that testimony in a documentary can be staged or re-enacted for 
dramatic purposes. Additionally, unlike a legal proceeding, documentary film does 
not allow for those who testify to be questioned or cross-examined by the viewer, 
nor does it guarantee for the accused the right of reply; Instead the viewer must trust 
in the good faith of the film-maker. 
The problematic relationship between truth and human rights film is illustrated 
by the attempts of film-makers after the Second World War to address the horrors of 
the Nazi period (Govedarica 2005). For Alain Resnais, director of the documentary 
about the Nazi death camps, Night and Fog (1955), the problem was one of how 
to depict these events without simply bombarding the viewer with horrific images 
of suffering, a tactic which would simply reduce the observer to either withdrawal 
or denial. Resnais describes the task of the film-maker in this situation as one of 
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‘how to maintain the image’s power to shock without evoking either total disbelief or 
incapacitating grief?’ (Flitterman-Lewis 1988, 205). Resnais’ response is the concept 
of ‘constructing forgetting… …tempering forgetfulness with a call to action, instead 
of passivity and withdrawal, which leads only to despair’ (Flitterman-Lewis 1988, 
205). This means that the documentary should do more than merely document 
reality. It must also be a call to action. This resonates with the subsequent idea that 
Human Rights Cinema must simultaneously attempt to describe reality and raise 
awareness. Night and Fog is divided into sections which juxtapose slow tracking shots 
of the deserted and overgrown death-camps with archive footage of Hitler’s rise to 
power.  It depicts the dreadful spectacle of daily life in the camps, the horror of mass 
exterminations and the Allied liberation of the camps. The film is accompanied by a 
spoken text, which leads the viewer through the footage, not as a litany of horror piled 
up upon horror, but rather as an ordinary account of extraordinary events intended 
to compel the viewer to responsibility and social action: ‘As Night and Fog proceeds, 
the viewer changes from an observer of documented events to a witness with the 
capacity for moral judgement’ (Flitterman-Lewis 1988, 211). The transformation of 
the concept of the spectator from observer to witness has later resonances with the 
concept of the spectator of Human Rights Cinema, as this article will discuss.
As Tascón observes, much of the ‘nomenclature’ of Human Rights Cinema is 
derived from an earlier cinematic movement, that of cinéma vérité (truthful cinema, 
sometimes described as ‘direct cinema’), which came to prominence on the 1960’s. 
(Tascón 2012). Cinéma verité, sought to make ‘real films’ dealing with ‘real life’. The 
movement was inspired by early directors such as Dziga Vertov and Robert Flaherty, 
and associated in the later twentieth century with directors such as Jean Rouch, 
Michel Brault and Robert Drew, who were particularly concerned by the relationship 
between documentary film and truth. Generally, cinéma verité seeks to reveal truth 
in cinema through the interaction between the film-maker and subject, typically 
without the guidance of a narrator. The intention of the film-maker is to film ‘real’ 
people, not professional actors, as directly as possible, acknowledging always both 
the role of the camera and of the film-maker him/herself in the process (Mamber 
1974, 3). Mamber describes the purpose of cinéma verité as ‘[stripping] away the 
accumulated conventions of traditional cinema in the hope of rediscovering a reality 
that eludes other forms of film-making’ (Mamber 1974, 4). Rather than absenting 
himself from the scene the film-maker must seek to reveal a truth without deceptions, 
as objectively as the medium will allow.
However, Edgar Morin, who was an influential theorist of the movement, 
observed, 
There are two ways to conceive of the cinema of the Real: the first is to pretend 
that you can present reality to be seen; the second is to pose the problem of 
reality. In the same way, there were two ways to conceive cinéma vérité. The first 
was to pretend that you brought truth. The second was to pose the problem of 
truth (quoted in Lee-Wright 2010, 93). 
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This search for truth sometimes required interviews with ‘real people’ to be stylized 
and provocative, staging scenes in order to reveal the ‘reality’ of what is being filmed. 
Cinéma verité also relied on conventions such as the use of hand-held cameras, grainy 
footage and intentional sound and continuity mistakes (Dancyger 2007, 122). These 
created the impression of a ‘real’ experience, and acted as indicators of truth and 
authenticity. Cinéma verité, for all of its hubristic claim to represent reality, could not 
avoid trading in the illusion of authenticity.
In his seminal film about the holocaust, Shoah (1985), Director Claude 
Lanzmann relied largely on interviews with survivors, bystanders and witnesses. The 
film falls into the category of Testimonial Documentary, and stands as an important 
visual record of those events. Shoah has many of the markers of ‘gritty truth’ that are 
familiar from cinéma verité, with interviews shot in grainy film and with footage of 
the film-makers themselves included in the film. However, despite its painstaking 
detail (the film took eleven years to make), Lanzmann does not take a strictly forensic 
attitude to the question of truth. Indeed, he described staging many of the key scenes, 
and had his interviewees re-enact their conversations. His purpose was not to falsify 
their stories, but, in the tradition of cinéma verité; to reveal their truth. 
Feature films have also struggled with how to deal with the question of how 
to depict human rights issues truthfully. In the post-war period, fictional movies 
dealing with Nazi horrors had to find a way of doing so without undermining their 
truth. Judgement at Nuremberg (1961) concerned the trial in post-war Germany of 
four German jurists, accused of crimes against humanity for their collaboration with 
the Nazi regime. The film dramatizes the actual trial in 1947 of several German jurists 
for war crimes and crimes against humanity arising from their collaboration. The 
trial did not form part of the Nuremberg war crimes tribunals, but was a subsequent 
legal process operated by the American occupation forces. The film examines in 
some detail the jurisprudential arguments surrounding the involvement of the 
German judiciary in the administration of Nazi justice. In particular, it focuses on 
the struggle of the American Judge Haywood, played by Spencer Tracy, to make 
a ruling on the culpability of the judges on trial. Most of the action takes place in 
the courtroom, although the relations between the occupation forces and the local 
population are also depicted (including an liaison between Judge Haywood and a 
local woman, played by Marlene Dietrich). At a crucial moment in the trial, the 
prosecutor screens an extract of actual newsreel footage from the death camps. The 
footage is overlaid with a spare commentary, narrated by the prosecutor, describing 
the events of the holocaust, from its planning to its gruesome execution. The footage 
includes images of naked bodies piled up for incineration, images that were very 
shocking for a feature film of the period. However, the use of the newsreel footage 
plays two important roles in the film. The first is that it has the effect of resolving the 
jurisprudential deadlock that has thus far dominated the narrative. As the footage 
is played, the film cuts to the faces of the various protagonists, so that we can its 
transformative effect on them. At the end of the newsreel footage, we see that Judge 
Haywood, who, until now, has been an inscrutable presence in the film, is visibly 
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moved by the experience. Judge Haywood wears a fixed expression, as if the only 
option left available to him in the face of such images is to convict the accused. In 
the face of this representation of horror, all legal arguments are silenced. The second 
problem resolved by this ‘film within a film’ is the problem of how to represent the 
holocaust in a fictional feature film. By making recourse to actual footage in the 
film’s moment of moral and legal judgement, Judgement at Nuremberg is able to bear 
witness to the Nazi horrors by suspending momentarily the conventions of fiction 
and replacing them with those of reportage. 
The use of documentary techniques as indicators of truth is also found in many 
other films in the Human Rights Cinema canon. Bronkhorst, for example, includes in 
his list of human rights films examples such as Schindler’s List (1993), Hotel Rwanda 
(2004) and The Killing Fields (1984), which merge aspects of documentary film with 
feature film in their attempt to re-create events in painstaking detail. These movies, 
sticking faithfully to the realist aesthetic of docudrama, also seek to do more than 
just tell a story but attempt to speak in a register of truth, and by doing so to increase 
awareness of particular human rights abuses. 
Despite the insistence of the Human Rights Film Network Charter on 
‘truthfulness’ as a distinguishing feature of human rights film, these examples 
indicate that the criterion is a problematic one. Films which have a social purpose 
have struggled to negotiate not just the boundary between documentary and feature 
film, but also between truth and fiction. The prioritisation of the documentary 
form as a form of truth-telling does not resolve the question, as the documentary 
form itself often relies on conventions that stage actual events in order to construct 
the impression of reality. The Charter relies on the presumption that what is 
portrayed in human rights documentary is a visual representation of reality. This 
presumption persists, despite the rich vocabulary of rhetorical tools evident in 
documentary film to manifest facticity, and despite the reliance of documentary on 
the narrative techniques of feature film. By situating Human Rights Cinema within 
a deliberative structure, Bronkhorst also places it within a register of truth-telling 
and communicative rationality. This presupposes that Human Rights Cinema is 
concerned with the depiction of reality in a way that is accessible to a system of 
rational normative communication, rather than one in which meaning fails, or is 
disrupted by unconscious desire.
Despite its fictional character, docudrama makes a claim to truth based on its 
attention to detail in recreating reality and the truth of the facts upon which it is 
based. If there is a hierarchy of truth in Human Rights Cinema, the lowest position 
in that hierarchy is occupied by pure fiction; by films that do not claim to represent 
reality as historical record. What is at stake here is not just a question of genre, but 
one of the relationship of Human Rights Cinema to truth. Human rights discourse, 
and indeed legal discourse more generally, presupposes a forensic relation to truth 
in which truth is to be determined by the impartial investigation of factual evidence. 
By contrast, the Charter of the Human Rights Film Network, by insisting on 
‘truthfulness’ as a condition of Human Rights Cinema presupposes a very different 
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kind of criterion; one that is based on the intention of the film-maker rather than 
the examination of factual evidence. Furthermore, as this article has examined, such 
a commitment may sometimes sit uncomfortably with the film-maker’s craft as a 
story-teller, or indeed with the social purpose of film-making. 
However, the inconsistencies in the way in which cinema is related to truth 
are elided by the Human Rights Charter’s conception of Human Rights Cinema as a 
humanitarian enterprise. This is rooted in a faith in film’s capacity to bear witness to 
man’s inhumanity to man; it is cinema as a tool of humanitarianism rather than of 
politics, and is reflected by the already mentioned claim in Article 2.3 of the Charter 
that human rights film ‘supersedes common notions of left and right’. However, 
the humanitarian tendency in Human Rights Cinema can also have the effect of 
‘flattening out’ the political context of human rights issues, reducing questions of 
desire, identity, class and gender to questions of human dignity. 
The humanitarianism of the Human Rights Film Network parallels a similar 
humanitarian tendency in human rights discourse more generally. In recent years, 
it has become common to portray human rights as a means of superseding political 
antagonism in favour of broad humanitarian interests. Wendy Brown, in a critique 
of Michael Ignatieff, for example, describes how humanitarianism:
…presents itself as something of an anti-politics, a pure defence of the innocent 
and the powerless against power, a pure defence of the individual against 
immense and potentially cruel or despotic machineries of culture, state, war, 
ethnic conflict, tribalism, patriarchy and other mobilizations or instantiations 
of power against individuals (Brown 2011, 134).  
The humanitarian tendency to de-politicise human rights treats human rights as 
a nothing more than a normative and legal tool that can resolve humanitarian 
wrongs, irrespective of the diverse historical and cultural contexts in which they 
occur. It translates ideological antagonism into a simple struggle for human dignity. 
Humanitarianism can thus have the effect of emptying human rights discourse of its 
emancipatory and transformative potential, neglecting its capacity to enable people 
to think differently about the socio-economic ordering of society. It turns human 
rights into a ‘safe’ normative discourse, consistent with the ordinary functioning of 
liberal democracy. 
2. Truth, fiction and The Act of Killing 
The Act of Killing (2012), directed by Joshua Oppenheimer, is a documentary film 
that raises difficult questions about the relationship between truth and fiction. The 
film was widely acclaimed, winning an Oscar nomination, a BAFTA award and 
multiple other awards. It was screened at many human rights film festivals but, as 
I will argue, it not only problematizes the relationship between truth and fiction 
in Human Rights Cinema, but it problematizes the very notion of Human Rights 
Cinema itself. 
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The film deals with the mass killings that took place in Indonesia in 1965–66, 
during the upheavals leading to President Suharto’s brutal accession to power. The 
killings were carried out by Indonesian army units and local vigilantes, who targeted 
suspected communists, leftists and ethnic Chinese. Although exact figures are not 
available, the estimated number of deaths varies between half a million and one 
million deaths (Gellately and Kiernan, 2003 290–291). Despite the terrible scale of 
these murders, they have been relatively unexamined in Indonesian society, largely 
due to the thirty years of repression that followed them. Indeed, as the film depicts, 
the killers are still celebrated openly as heroes and have significant influence in 
politics, business and media.
The Act of Killing follows the present-day lives of some of the perpetrators of the 
massacres, notably Anwar Congo, Adi Zulkadry and Herman Koto. The protagonists 
had been small time gangsters in the city of Medan, Northern Sumatra in the 1960s, 
who made money from the sale of black-market movie tickets. When the disturbances 
began, they went from these obscure beginnings to become the leaders of the most 
powerful death squad in Northern Sumatra. As well as murder and torture, they 
also extorted money from ethnic Chinese inhabitants as the price for keeping their 
lives. Today, Anwar is revered as a founding father of Pemuda Pancasila, a right-
wing paramilitary organization that grew out of the death squads (Anderson 2000). 
In the film, the protagonists speak unashamedly about how they murdered their 
victims. They discuss, for example, how best to strangle a man to death with a piece 
of wire, even acting it out for the camera. These accounts are difficult to listen to, as 
they describe atrocious deeds in a dispassionate, matter of fact way. In one account, 
Anwar describes the clothes he used to wear when carrying out murders, and how 
he struggled to avoid staining his trousers with the blood of his victims. He claims 
in the film to have personally murdered some one thousand people. This chilling 
frankness is the first shocking aspect of this film. The moral universe depicted in this 
film is one in which ordinary mores are turned upside down, where gangsters are 
feted, and where their acts of murder, torture, and extortion, are rewarded with both 
political influence and celebrity.
Some early parts of the film might look like Testimonial Documentary, with 
little evident intervention from the film-makers in the testimony. However, this 
film does not pursue the aesthetic of ‘gritty truth’ found in Shoah or cinema verité; 
instead it does something radically different. Anwar and his friends are invited 
by the film-makers to make a feature film about their crimes, to re-create scenes 
from the massacres in whatever style they chose. The process of making this ‘film 
within a film’ itself becomes the main subject of the documentary. Director Joshua 
Oppenheimer, said: 
To explore the killers’ astounding boastfulness, and to test the limits of their 
pride, we began with began with documentary portraiture and simple re-
enactments of the massacres. But when we realised what kind of movie Anwar 
and his friends wanted to make about the genocide, the re-enactments became 
more elaborate. And so we offered Anwar and his friends the opportunity to 
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dramatize the killings using a choice of genres (western, gangster, musical). 
That is, we gave them the chance to script, direct and star in the scenes they had 
in mind when they were killing people (quoted in Žižek 2014, 307). 
As the film progresses, it takes a stylistic turn towards increasingly elaborate and 
surreal scenarios of staged killing and torture. Oppenheimer has called the result 
‘a documentary of the imagination rather than a documentary of everyday life’ 
(Bradshaw 2013). The Act of Killing is a thoroughly disorientating film, shifting 
between scenes of observed dialogue in a ‘fly on the wall’ style, interactions between 
the perpetrators and the director, scenes of staged interrogation, torture and murder, 
a realistic re-staging of the violent burning of a village, musical scenes and surreal 
scenes of dream-like fantasy. The result is unsettling, not just because conventional 
morality seems are inverted, but also because the distinction between reality and 
fiction is unclear, as is the role of the film-maker in the production of meaning.
While the film has received great critical acclaim, it has also been strongly 
criticized for the way it addresses questions of human rights, with one critic describing 
it as a ‘snuff movie’ (Fraser 2014). Oppenheimer has responded: 
the film is not violent, and all those appearing in the re-enactments are 
perpetrators, paramilitary leaders, and their immediate family members—that 
is, there are no survivors in the dramatizations. And there are certainly no 
scenes documenting actual physical violence (Oppenheimer 2014).
Nonetheless, an important criticism is that the film does not give a voice to the 
victims of the crimes, focusing instead entirely on the perpetrators: 
To have the perpetrators legitimate and re-enact their crimes on camera courts 
a morally obscene jouissance of impunity, a re-perpetrating in representation if 
you will, and may be seen as endorsing a sympathetic portrait of ‘traumatized 
heroes’ (Hogan and Marín-Dòmine 2014, 7).
A second criticism is that the film says little about the role of the military in the 
killings, failing to address the common misconception that these killings were 
carried out by rogue psychopathic elements, rather than being coordinated at the 
highest levels (Cribb 2013). Additionally, the film says little about the role of the 
subsequent Indonesian New Order regime in maintaining a history of silence about 
the events (Hogan and Marín-Dòmine 2014, 7). Another criticism has been that the 
film’s portrayal of Indonesia as a ‘gangster paradise’ is an unconsciously chauvinistic 
portrayal, a freak-show of the primitive for Western audiences (Godmilow 2014). 
However, for the purposes of this article the criticism that raises the most 
difficult question is that of the relation of the film to truth. It is not always clear in 
the film where the boundary between truth and fiction lies. We have no means, for 
example, of knowing whether the protagonists are telling the truth, nor does the 
film explain the full role of the film-makers in staging the scenarios re-enacted by 
the protagonists. There have been allegations that participants were manipulated 
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into performing the roles that they played. Anwar Congo, for example, has said that 
he believed that he was participating in the making of a genuine feature film called 
Arsan and Aminah, not the documentary film that was produced. He has added that 
if he had known the real nature of the project, he would not have participated in The 
Act of Killing (Sweedler 2014, 16). 
The film-makers have argued that their purpose was not to give a platform to 
the perpetrators but to confront them with their deeds and to raise awareness of the 
impunity with which these events have been treated in Indonesia. In a comment that 
addresses some of the criticisms of the film, Oppenheimer observed:
The question in mind was this: what does it mean to live in, and be governed by, 
a regime whose power rests on the performance of mass murder and its boastful 
public recounting, even as it intimidates survivors into silence (Oppenheimer 
2012). 
However, directorial intervention in this film does seem to go considerably beyond 
the usual role of the documentary-maker in the human-rights film tradition, even 
accounting for the active role of the film-maker as provocateur in cinema verité. 
At the very least, the boundary between fiction and truth that is proper to the 
documentary genre is tested by this film. The film has little in the way of a meta-
narrative to explain the methodology of the film-makers. Indeed, there are moments 
in it is difficult to distinguish between what is ‘real’ and what is ‘staged’ in the film. 
The suspension of a realistic aesthetic is evident from the extraordinary opening 
scene, where we see dancers emerging from a giant fish into a lush landscape. In that 
scene, instructions to the dancers are shouted from the background, including the 
prescient reminder that ‘this is not fake!’ 
There are also scenes in the film where the fiction of the film-within-a-film 
comes undone, interrupted by uncanny moments that point towards the unconscious. 
In the crucial scene of the staged attack on the town of Kampung Kolang, we know 
from the beginning that this is a reconstruction, as the preparations for the scene 
have been shown in some detail. However, the attack is simply too intense, too ‘real’ to 
watch comfortably. In the filming of the scene, the violent energy of the paramilitaries 
seems to erupt out of control. The staged violence of the scene is unsettling enough, 
but the fiction disintegrates when a woman collapses after the scene, and a girl 
begins to cry uncontrollably. Attempts by the Pemuda Pancasila paramilitaries to 
console them are to no avail. The woman’s collapse and the crying child make a 
jagged intervention into the re-enactment, breaking the fragile boundary between 
truth and fiction. As Milo Sweedler observes: 
In contrast to the relation between fiction and reality suggested by Anwar 
Congo at the beginning of the film, when he claims to have drawn inspiration 
from Hollywood films for the murders he committed, here the movement is the 
reverse. The simulation of violence produces its own violent effects on those 
who re-enact it (Sweedler, 2014, 24). 
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What is revealed in the staged fiction of the burning of Kampung Kolang is not the 
direct ‘truth’ typical to testimonial documentary. Instead, the conception of truth 
here is, to paraphrase Lacan, structured as a fiction; a film within a film, whose 
veracity, and indeed very existence is not at all clear. The Act of Killing, rather than 
relying on the stylistic markers of authenticity that are the hallmark of Human Rights 
Cinema, is an exercise in fiction, allowing a different register of truth to emerge as 
the limit of what fiction can sustain. 
As this essay has already discussed, Human Rights Cinema insists on 
truthfulness as a defining value, and prioritizes a realist aesthetic as the primary 
means of expressing this. The Act of Killing, however, approaches the question of 
truth in a very different way. The film employs dream-like imagery at various points, 
perhaps none so strange as the scene where a protagonist speaks to the decapitated 
head of one of his victims. The head, played by Anwar Congo, sits perched on a 
rock, immobile and struggling not to retch while another of the killers pushes pieces 
of rotten meat into his mouth. The scene is reminiscent of Samuel Beckett’s Happy 
Days, in which the life predicament of the protagonist, Winnie, is illustrated by 
her being buried up to the neck, trapped and unable to move. Anwar’s head oozes 
with bright crimson fake blood, a scene that would be ridiculous if it were not for 
its horrific context. This nightmarish scene hints at a far more disturbing reality 
that underpins the ‘normality’ which Anwar Congo and his colleagues inhabit; 
an unspeakable horror that exceeds ‘normal’ representation. In this scene, it is as 
if the bizarre ‘normality’ of the killers that has been depicted thus far, from their 
casual conversations about torture and murder to their homely family lives, all now 
seem haunted by a hidden visceral horror, a piece of the Real, embodied here by a 
dismembered head on a rock, conscious but incapable of action; immobilized by the 
spectacle of its own atrocity. 
3. The act of watching
There is, however, another way to approach The Act of Killing. This is to examine 
what it tells us about spectatorship. This is a film that is concerned not just with the 
act of killing, but also with the act of watching. The film presents its viewers with 
the spectacle of perpetrators watching the recreation of the terrible events that have 
defined them. In scene after scene, we not only watch the meticulous recreation of 
murder and torture, but we also watch the perpetrators as actors and directors in 
their own drama. In this interaction, the camera lingers occasionally on the face of 
Anwar Congo and his colleagues as they observe the surreal reconstructions of their 
crimes. In some scenes, the camera shifts away from the reconstruction, and focuses 
on Anwar, as if it were seeking an explanation in his gaze for the bizarre cavalcade 
of cruelty being reconstructed. However, his face provides few answers. Sometimes 
his expressions are blank. At other times, he appears bemused, and at others again, 
he seems disturbed by what he sees. At one stage, after the re-enactment of massacre 
at Kampung Kolang, he seems genuinely overwhelmed by the scene of destruction. 
Throughout the film, however, the gaze of the perpetrator remains inscrutable, not 
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delivering for the spectator the recognition of his responsibility that might make 
sense of such unrelenting cruelty. Anwar’s empty gaze neither recognizes, nor does 
it seek recognition from others. Instead, the perpetrators appear to be not only 
incapable of moral action, but to be impassive spectators of the horrors they have 
created. 
This brings us to the role of the spectator in Human Rights Cinema. Does 
the concept of Human Rights Cinema not also demand a different approach 
to spectatorship? Spectatorship in Human Rights Cinema is not posited as the 
vicarious enjoyment that one might experience while watching a horror, or a thriller, 
for example. Instead, it presupposes a commitment to the values of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and, at a deeper level, a moral responsibility with 
respect to the content of what is being viewed. Human Rights Cinema is, after all, 
meant to be truthful; a communication which, in Bronkhorst’s terms, is situated 
within a normative system. However, does such a concept of spectatorship not 
also presuppose that human rights spectatorship itself demands recognition? The 
Human Rights Film Charter links Human Rights Cinema to activism, but also to 
truthfulness. The value of truthfulness in Human Rights Cinema transforms the 
spectator into a witness, thereby eliding the concept of the spectator with that of 
the activist. Accordingly, the role of the spectator in Human Rights Cinema is to 
recognize the suffering of the human rights victim through the act of spectatorship. 
In this way, activism and spectatorship are bound together by the concept of Human 
Rights Cinema in a circle of self-affirming virtue. 
However, the concept of Human Rights Cinema also presupposes a third 
position in the intersubjective network—the position is that from which the 
spectator’s responsible (or indeed virtuous) recognition is itself recognized. In 
this way, the concept of Human Rights Cinema is organized around a desire for 
the spectator’s recognition of the suffering of the human rights victim to itself 
be recognized. To borrow a Lacanian term, the desire for the recognition of the 
spectator’s recognition appeals to the Big Other for the recognition of spectatorship 
as a kind of activism, despite its self-evident passivity. As such, there is an underlying 
narcissism in Human Rights Cinema—that narcissism is the conceit that the Big 
Other can successfully mediate the duality between spectator and human rights 
victim, thereby affirming the value inherent in the act of watching. In contrast to the 
‘innocent’ spectatorship involved in other film genres, the spectatorship of Human 
Rights Cinema presupposes a spectatorship that is responsible, active, and affirmed 
by the global normative system of human rights. This gives us another perspective 
on the Human Rights Film Charter, not as an attempt to merely imitate international 
human rights norms but to find a normative affirmation for the truth-telling capacity 
of Human Rights Cinema and for the idea of the Human Rights Cinema spectator 
as passive activist. 
An interrogation of the spectatorship of Human Rights Cinema also gives us 
another way to examine the way in which the concept of Human Rights Cinema 
appears at times to occupy an unquestionable moral high ground. The spectator 
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of Human Rights Cinema at a human rights film festival may witness the most 
unimaginable horrors on the screen, often without the guard-rail of fiction. In 
Testimonial Documentary, for example, the spectator may bear witness to the 
most outrageous and violent depravities, believing it not to be a form of vicarious 
enjoyment but an obligation owed to the greater project of human rights. However, 
unlike a horror film, which situates the enjoyment of the spectator clearly in the 
field of fiction, and is understood from the beginning to be a fantasy, Human Rights 
Cinema does entirely the opposite—it assures the spectator that the horror being 
witnessed is not fictional but is, in fact, true. Rather than turning away, the spectator 
is compelled to endure, in the belief that his or her continued spectatorship is a form 
of activism, an obscene enjoyment capable of being recognized as virtuous behavior; 
a sign of spectator’s commitment to the values of human rights.
What then, does The Act of Killing tell us about spectatorship and Human 
Rights Cinema? The centrality of spectatorship to the film is illustrated in one scene 
where Anwar Congo is shown operating a movie camera. He is shown in silence, 
slowly surveying the film set. As well as being a perpetrator, actor and film-maker, 
he is also depicted here as a spectator, both re-making and watching his own past. 
The interchangeability in the film of the watcher and the watched brings home the 
way in which the cinema-goer is himself or herself implicated in this network. Is the 
viewer of the film, like Anwar, and indeed Oppenheimer, not also implicated in the 
manufacture of Anwar’s role as a celebrity murderer merely by the act of watching? 
The opaque role of the makers of the film in enabling Anwar and his colleagues to 
act out their crimes for the camera adds to this sensation. There are no ‘innocent’ 
spectators in The Act of Killing. 
The Act of Killing is not a film that seeks to challenge its audience with factual 
evidence of the crimes committed in Indonesia, but in fact renders impossible 
the act of ‘bearing witness’. It is a film that attempts to unsettle its spectators by 
continually blurring the boundary between fact and fiction, and indeed between 
fantasy and ‘reality’. While some scenes that are seemingly un-staged are so bizarre 
that the viewer may doubt their plausibility, many of those that are deliberately 
staged appear nightmarish and unsettling. In one such scene, an actor representing 
one of Anwar’s victims appears, removes a wire noose from his neck and awards 
Anwar with a medal. He thanks Anwar him for executing him and sending him to 
heaven. This fiction would be unsettling enough, until we recall that Anwar is in fact 
a real killer, and that this bizarre scene is a real mass murderer’s stylized fantasy of 
redemption. The Act of Killing, as a ‘documentary of the imagination’, allows no space 
for a disinterested spectatorship, no clear line between truth and fiction. Instead, it 
is more like a waking dream, in which the public impunity of the perpetrators is 
perpetually haunted and disturbed by the ghosts of their victims.
All of this leads us to an important distinction between the nature of 
spectatorship in The Act of Killing and that presupposed by the principles of Human 
Rights Cinema. The Act of Killing does not ‘inform’ the spectator as a passive observer 
of events. Instead, it unsettles, disorientates and implies the spectator in the creation 
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of the perpetrators’ grisly celebrity. The film offers the spectator no external meta-
position from which to judge, or bear witness to the terrible events of the Indonesian 
massacres. By contrast, the concept of Human Rights Cinema presupposes just such 
a meta-position; the position of a rational observer within a normative system, not 
unlike that of a court or a human rights committee; an objective recipient of the 
truths that are conveyed by the act of watching.
4. The Act of Killing and the collapse of the Other
However, there is another way to think about the relation between The Act of Killing 
and Human Rights Cinema. This is to think about the very different ways in which 
they relate to questions of ideology and authority in public discourse. In particular, 
an analysis of both The Act of Killing and the Human Rights Network Film Charter 
offers very divergent perspectives on the concept of the Big Other and its capacity to 
structure social relations. Slavoj Žižek (who is, incidentally, thanked in the credits 
of the film), has described The Act of Killing as a documentary about the ‘real effects 
of living a fiction’ (Žižek 2013). He draws attention to a particularly shocking scene 
in the film, in which Anwar and his men appear on a 2007 Indonesian talk show. 
Anwar proudly explains the influence of gangster movies on his killings. When the 
interviewer asks whether he fears reprisals from the families of their victims, Anwar 
responds ‘They can’t. When they raise their heads, we wipe them out.’ His colleague 
adds, ‘We’ll exterminate them all’. Rather than provoking shock or censure, these 
bloodthirsty declarations are greeted with smiles from the presenter and cheers 
from the audience. Žižek suggests that: ‘The trap to be avoided here is the easy 
one of putting the blame on either Hollywood or on the “ethical primitiveneness” 
of Indonesia’ (Žižek 2013). Instead, he says that ‘the starting point should be the 
dislocating effects of capitalist globalization which by undermining the “symbolic 
efficacy” of traditional ethical structures, creates such a moral vacuum’ (Žižek 
2013). 
Žižek is here returning to a long-standing theme in his work which he has 
variously described as the ‘collapse’ or ‘retreat’ of the Big Other (See Žižek, 1997). 
The Lacanian concept of the Big Other here operates as the order of language and 
law in relation to whose address the subject symptomatically attempts to situate its 
identity. Žižek has described over numerous works how global capitalism has been 
supported at an ideological level by the collapse of the Big Other, by which he means 
the decline of paternal authority, custom and moral norms (See Žižek 1993, 231–
237). He has described a corollary collapse in the efficacy of the symbolic systems 
that have for so long defined our social, ethical and moral worlds. His work describes 
a societal shift towards a social order that can be described as post-Oedipal, in which 
social norms disintegrate and in which the boundaries of what is usually understood 
as acceptable social behavior are no longer clear. 
In more recent writings, Žižek describes this process of disintegration in 
relation to the proliferation of the culture of public confessions and the dissemination 
via social media of the most intimate aspects of private life (Žižek 2014). Rather 
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than seeing this as an erosion of an ever-shrinking private sphere, as one might 
expect, Žižek claims the opposite, that it is the public space that is being privatized 
through the extension of private fantasies into the private space of others. In his 
account, the concept of the public space that has characterised the modern era is 
not only eroded, but under threat from the irruption into it of private fantasies that 
would have hitherto been taboo. The concept of the public space here operates as the 
big Other; as a system of ordering in the ethical and social field, whose ideological 
collapse creates the appearance of a ‘social and moral vacuum’. In this collapse, the 
boundary between the private and the public appears to dissolve and the expression 
of previously unspeakable fantasies loses its capacity to shock: 
What kind of symbolic texture, or set of rules between what is publicly 
acceptable and what is not exists in a society where even the minimal level of 
public shame is suspended, and the monstrous orgy of torture and killing can 
be publicly celebrated even decades after it took place, not even as a necessary 
crime for the public good, but as an ordinary acceptable pleasurable activity? 
(Žižek 2014, 308). 
In Žižek’s account, it is this collapse of public space, and the corollary diminution 
of superego pressure, that ‘normalises’ Anwar Congo’s cruelty, and makes his lack of 
shame appear publicly acceptable. 
The Act of Killing depicts in vivid form not just the erosion of the Big Other, but 
its consequence; an ethical void. For Žižek, the crisis in the Big Other is ideological, 
a function of the onward march of global capitalism. He considers cynicism and an 
attitude of ironic detachment not merely as symptoms of what Ernest Mandel has 
described as ‘late capitalism’ (Mandel 1975), but part of its official ideology: 
[This] cynicism is not a direct position of immorality, it is more like morality 
itself put in the service of immorality—the model of cynical wisdom is to 
conceive probity, integrity, as a supreme form of dishonesty, and morals as a 
supreme form of profligacy, the truth as the most effective form of a lie. This 
cynicism is therefore a kind of perverted ‘negation of the negation’ of the official 
ideology: confronted with illegal enrichment, with robbery, the cynical reaction 
consists in saying that legal enrichment is a lot more effective and, moreover, 
protected by the law. (Žižek 1989, 30.)
The detachment from moral consequence evidenced in The Act of Killing does not 
simply depict a country’s failure to confront it past, but also the collapse of the 
social structures that make ethical judgement possible. In Žižek’s terms, this ethical 
disintegration is a thoroughly ideological one. It should be added here that Indonesia 
has been a poster child for economic success in the global market, a member of the 
G20, with good figures for economic growth, committed to market reforms and 
privatisation (International Monetary Fund 2016). Indeed, the film alludes to this 
economic context with seemingly random shots of billboards, high end commercial 
activity and shopping centres. However, the film, as well as relentlessly depicting the 
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moral lacuna that defines Indonesia’s relation to its past, also lays bare the ideological 
nature of that economic commitment. 
It is in relation to the concept of the Big Other that we find an important 
philosophical divergence between The Act of Killing and the concept of Human 
Rights Cinema. This article has already discussed the way in which the Human 
Rights Film Network reflects the dominant tendency in human rights discourse to 
prioritise a global humanitarianism capable of transcending the political. However, 
such humanitarianism must also presuppose the existence a system of signification 
by which its normative coherency can be guaranteed, if not a public space in which 
ethical differences can be resolved. More generally, humanitarianism, like all 
successful political discourse, presupposes the existence of a Big Other by which the 
subject can attempt to find something of him/herself in humanitarian discourse. In 
this way, the subject can identify him/herself as representing humanitarian values. 
Whereas the Act of Killing depicts the collapse of the Big Other, the Human Rights 
Film Network does the opposite, by presupposing the existence of the Big Other. In 
Lacanian terms, Human Rights Cinema operates ideologically as a means of denying 
the Lack in the Big Other. Perhaps this difference is another reason why the Act 
of Killing, while undoubtedly a milestone in documentary cinema, might not sit 
entirely comfortably within the canon of Human Rights Cinema.
This brings us back once again to the question of spectatorship. It is the operation 
of the Big Other the allows the spectator of Human Rights Cinema to imagine that 
their humanitarian commitment is somehow capable of being recognised and 
is thereby in itself meaningful. The spectator is not here conceived of as a passive 
observer, but as a participant in a system of normative exchange with the film-maker 
and with other members of ‘the human rights community’. The concept of the Big 
Other allows the spectator the conceit that his/her recognition of the suffering of 
others can itself be recognised through ‘participation’ in Human Rights Cinema. In 
this way, spectatorship is transformed into participation in the humanitarian project 
through the act of watching. 
5. Conclusion
Towards the end of The Act of Killing, there is a scene in which the film-maker 
accompanies Anwar Congo to the rooftop where many of his murders took place, 
where earlier in the film he has described his crimes in horrifying detail. It might be 
expected that in these closing moments, the film might provide some note of hope, 
perhaps an expression of regret by the perpetrator, or a recognition of the cruelty he 
has inflicted. Instead, Anwar retches and gags repeatedly, attempting to vomit, but 
seemingly unable to do so. In these extended moments, it is as if he were attempting 
to expel something from within his body. However, still no words come out. The 
viewer does not know if Anwar has been overcome with guilt for his actions, or if he 
is simply unwell, or indeed if he is simply performing this purgative moment for the 
camera. The film here refuses to deliver the viewer with the answer s/he wants. There 
is no moment of remorse, no redemptive moment, no answer to the many questions 
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the film has opened. Instead, this is a film that can leave the viewer not just shocked, 
but also bewildered. While it is tempting to see this event as a bodily manifestation 
of remorse, or a bodily return of the horrors he has repressed, the true message of 
his retching is that there is no message. There are no words that can properly bring 
this film to a close.
The refusal of this film to provide a moment of normative closure also points to 
the broader critique that has been made in this article of Human Rights Cinema. It 
has been argued that Human Rights Cinema tends to make broad assumptions about 
the nature of truth and its relation to fiction; assumptions that are not borne out by 
an analysis of the documentary and feature film genres. The humanitarian impulse 
that drives the Human Rights Cinema movement, while capable of concealing the 
inconsistency of such assumptions, also tends to negate more radical or emancipatory 
interpretations of human rights. The idea that ‘truthfulness’ can provide a satisfactory 
normative basis for Human Rights Cinema is also problematic, as it presupposes a 
necessary correlation between intentionality and signification. This article has also 
insisted upon a more critical approach to the question of spectatorship in Human 
Rights Cinema, drawing attention to the illusion that Human Rights Cinema 
spectatorship is an ethical act in itself, a form of passive activism with no negative 
consequences for the spectator. The concept of Human Rights Cinema presupposes 
the un-lacking omniscience of Human Rights discourse qua Big Other. However, its 
ready embrace of a humanitarian logic risks stripping human rights discourse of its 
potential for social change, rendering it an empty hulk of good intentions and empty 
principles, rather than a means of transforming peoples’ lives. The de-politicization 
of human rights discourse makes it less able to provide an ideological resistance 
to the ethical wilderness that underpins the onward march of global capitalism; a 
consequence laid bare by The Act of Killing. 
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